the strong possibility for abuse and inconsistency, 1 3 and, accordingly, the need for rigorous and effective judicial controls exists.
This Article considers possible legal impediments 14 to criminal tion and follow-up actions) must give approval after a review of the recommendation ....
Fourth, the district director must approve the recommended action (for prosecutions . . . approval of the regional food and drug director is also needed).
Fifth, the bureau responsible for the product category receives the report in its compliance unit and... weed [s] out insufficient field recommendations, returning some for further development.
Sixth, the regulatory management staff of the Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs ... reviews [the recommendation] for appropriateness in the use of legal resources.
Seventh, the recommendation goes to the Deputy Chief Counsel for litigation in the office of Chief General Counsel.
Eighth, in criminal cases, the commissioner's office may review the prosecution under general oversight responsibilities.
Ninth, the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, Consumer Affairs Section, reviews criminal ... cases.
Finally, the United States Attorney for the local area in which the violative goods or persons are located is requested to bring the case to court. I J. O'REILLY, FoOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 2.04 at 2-9 to 2-10 (1979) 13 See Corporate Crime, supra note 4, at 1308-11 (noting the "disparity of treatment" and "arbitrariness" that often results from the broad discretion given in agencies).
14 The legal impediments are to be distinguished from the factual arguments that counsel should make at all review levels, including review by the United States Attorney. See generally W. Lockhart, Report on the Exercise of Discretion in Prosecution of Violations of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (Oct. 10, 1975)(unpublished first draft of a report submitted to the Administrative Conference of the United States). The Report notes that in 1972 an average of seven or more months expired between the FDA's inspection and the referral of a case to the United States Attorney. Id. at 35. Professor Lockhart criticizes the prosecution process at length because of the inconsistent and conflicting policies that exist among and within the FDA, the Consumer Affairs Section of the Department ofJustice, and the United States Attorney's Office. He also discusses numerous factual considerations that, at one or more stages, have entered into decisions not to prosecute. See, e.g., id. at 60, 150 (non-prosecution of the individuals who are less responsible for the actions undergoing review); id. at 71-73 (non-prosecution of individuals who "have left the company or been demoted to less responsible positions subsequent to the violations"); id. at 75 (non-prosecution of individuals because of "poor health" or because they were "civic leader[s] of some prominence").
It is difficult to ascertain whether the lack of coordination and the inconsistent policies in the criminal enforcement of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act are representative of criminal enforcement at the federal level. At the very least, federal officials have made a concerted effort to provide standards, guidance and consistency in the criminal prosecution of bank officials. On April 2, 1985, Attorney General Edwin Meese, III, announced "the signing of an agreement between the Department ofJustice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and four federal banking regulatory agencies designed to improve the detection, investigation, and prosecution of bank fraud cases, particularly those involving criminal misconduct on the part of bank officers." Department of'Justice [Vol. 78 prosecution in routine cases in which a corporate or individual defendant has not first been warned of the alleged violations and given an opportunity to take remedial actions.' 5 There are at least two reasons why criminal prosecution may be inappropriate in this situation. 1 6 First, prosecution might violate the Accardi doctrine, which posits that "[a]n agency of the government must scrupulously observe rules, regulations, or procedures which it has established."' 17 News Release, Apr. 2, 1985, at 1. A "principal objective" of this agreement was to provide "uniform referral procedures both for routine and significant cases," including the use of "a standard referral 'form for all four agencies." Id. 15 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. The FDA's prior-warning policy is distinct from the "Section 305" hearing that the Act requires the FDA to provide. Section 305 states that " [b] efore any violation.., is reported by the Secretary to any United States attorney for institution of a criminal proceeding, the person against whom such proceeding is contemplated shall be given appropriate notice and an opportunity to present his views, either orally or in writing, with regard to the contemplated proceeding." 21 U.S.C. § 335. Despite the existence of this provision, the Supreme Court has held that a Section 305 hearing "is not a prerequisite to prosecution. 16 Additional legal arguments may be available in a given case. For example, an individual defendant may be able to argue that he did not hold a "responsible relation" to the alleged violation. See Park, 421 U.S. at 670-76; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281-85; United States v. Torgian Laboratories, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1514, 1530-31 (E.D.N.Y.) (president convicted because "he was the individual ... who had overall and ultimate responsibility for all.., operations" and "the responsibility and authority to implement measures to insure that contamination of [contact] lenses sterilized by the corporation did not occur"), aff'd mer., 751 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1984 Second, a decision by the FDA in a routine case to recommend the prosecution of a defendant who has not first been warned and given an opportunity to act would be arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion because the FDA typically has not recommended prosecution of similarly situated parties in the past. This latter argument parallels the identical FDA policy that supports the Accardi argument. It is, however, a distinct argument which is grounded in the well-established principle that "[platently inconsistent application of agency standards to similar situations lacks rationality and is arbitrary" action prohibited under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 18 Apart from the Accardi argument, which some courts say is based upon due process principles, constitutional challenges on either due process or equal protection grounds may also be available. These challenges, however, are not likely to succeed. As discussed below, no constitutional rights are implicated unless a United States Attorney decides to prosecute. The United States Attorney's Office has almost limitless discretion with regard to prosecution decisions.' 9 Most cases, therefore, present neither the compelling facts nor the necessary legal predicates to invalidate a decision to prosecute on constitutional grounds.
II. THE FDA's PRIOR-WARNING POLICY
In most cases, the FDA sends a "regulatory" letter, 20 an "information" letter or some other type of warning to a company or individual regarding suspected violations. 2 1 These letters implement regulations or procedures, "its action cannot stand and courts will strike it down." Id. The precise underpinnings of the Accardi doctrine are unclear. See infra note 83. 18 Contractors Transport Corp. v. United States, 537 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir.
1976).
19 See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 20 "A regulatory letter is a blunt warning about alleged violations of the... Act, sent by the [FDA's] field or headquarters offices to firms or individuals thought to be responsible for the violation. The letters, officially called 'notices of adverse findings,' generally are sent following an unsatisfactory inspection .... " I J. O'REILLY, SUpra note 12, 6.02 at 6-4 through 6-5. See also FDA REGULATORY PROCEDURE MANUAL pt. 8-10-20, at 2 ("[regulatory] letters ... are used primarily to effect prompt correction. They are also a way of providing prior warning and notice to responsible officials of possible civil or criminal actions").
21 Potential defendants should consider filing a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request to fill any gaps in the FDA's interaction with a particular company or individual. In particular, potential defendants should attempt to obtain copies of all regulatory and information letters and a copy of the company Compliance Profile Record. The Compliance Profile Record is located at the FDA's district office and lists the firm's history of inspections and regulatory actions. The FDA, however, may refuse to release these materials because of the on-going investigation and enforcement proceed-the FDA's stated policy of giving warnings prior to instituting enforcement actions in routine cases. This policy is set forth in numerous provisions of the FDA's Regulatory Procedures Manual,   2 2 including:
When it is consistent with the public interest, it is FDA's policy to advise regulated firms of potentially violative products, practices or conditions, or of violations requiring correction; and to give firms an opportunity to make corrections voluntarily prior to initiating legal or administrative action. , as these policy statements are not formal rules or regulations produced by rule-making or adjudication. Cf 21 C.F.R. pt. 7 (1986) (entitled "Enforcement Policy," referencing its purpose of "assur[ing] uniform and consistent application of practices and procedures throughout the agency," id. at 7.1; it does not, however, address the prior-warning policy). Instead, the policy statements probably would be viewed by a court as informal guidelines for inspectors or other FDA employees. According to the FDA, formal "guidelines" state procedures or standards of general applicability that are not legal requirements but are acceptable to FDA for a subject matter which falls within the laws administered by the Commissioner." Id. at 10.90(b)(1). In this regard, "[tihe Commissioner advises that guidelines in staff manuals are not formal 'guidelines ' With the exception of cases involving gross violations, fraud, or danger to health, each prosecution must ordinarily contain counts which show a continuous course of conduct. This may consist of counts from two inspections, or counts from separate violative shipments at different points in time. This is because, except in aggravated circumstances, the agency ordinarily exercises its prosecutorial discretion to seek criminal sanctions against an individual only where a prior warning or other notification to the individual can be shown. The normal procedure of establishing a background of warning or other notification before prosecution will demonstrate to the U.S. Attorney, the judge, and the jury that there has been a continuous course of violative conduct and a failure to effect correction. Bear in mind that failure to correct a violative situation after notification will result in prosecution on thefirst incident as well as on subsequent incidents. The involvement of administrative agencies in the criminal enforcement of federal statutes raises procedural and substantive legal issues rarely addressed by the parties in a given case or by the courts. The following discussion examines these issues. This Article suggests that the administrative law/criminal law overlap arising from such enforcement implicates substantial legal rights of potential defendants and that these rights should be vigorously protected by the courts. This protection is particularly crucial in the context of criminal enforcement of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act because that Act is essentially a strict liability statute. 
A.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES: THRESHOLD REVIEWABILITY PROBLEMS
The question of reviewability is a threshold procedural issue for parties considering a challenge to a criminal prosecution initiated by the FDA. Although in-depth treatment is beyond the scope of this Article, the issue is important because pre-indictment review should not be relied upon automatically.
Pre-enforcement Judicial Review
Pre-enforcement/pre-indictment judicial review of a FDA decision to recommend criminal prosecution will rarely be available. Here an administrative agency is merely determining whether a judicial proceeding should be instituted. Moreover, its findings of probable cause, while a necessary prerequisite to multiple seizures, has no effect in and of itself. All proceedings for the enforcement of the Act or to restrain violations of it must be brought by and in the name of [a] matter is committed by law to the discretion of the Commissioner, e.g., a decision to recommend or not to recommend civil or criminal enforcement"). Cf. Georator Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765, 767-68 (4th Cir. 1979) (district court lacks jurisdiction to review the EEOC's "determination of reasonable cause on the charge of discrimination" because the determination "is merely preparatory to further proceedings" and "[n]o... finality exists"). By holding that a FDA decision "not to exercise its enforcement authority" 39 is "not subject to review under the APA," 40 the Court distinguished such non-action from those instances in which "an agency does act to enforce." 4 ' This language arguably supports the conclusion that a FDA criminal referral is subject to judicial review. 4 2 The overall tenor of the Court's decision is to the contrary, however, and, in support, the Court specifically cited the FDA regulation which states that the Agency "'shall object to judicial review ... if... [t]he matter is committed by the law to the discretion of the Commissioner, e.g., a decision to recommend or not to recommend civil or criminal enforcement action .... " ,,43 Thus, although Chaney is relevant to this discussion, its import remains unclear.
In light of Ewing and Chaney, a party has little chance of successfully challenging at the pre-indictment stage a decision by the FDA to refer a case for criminal prosecution. 4 )). 44 Cases that have allowed pre-enforcement review of FDA actions are easily distinguished from the case in which a single individual or company has allegedly violated the Act's provisions. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)(preenforcement review of an industry-wide FDA labeling regulation). In Abbott, the Court specifically distinguished Ewing as a "proceeding against a particular drug manufacturer," rather than an agency "promulgation of a self-operative industry-wide regulation." Id. at 137. The Court added that the Ewing decision "was quite clearly correct" and that, "like a determination by a grand jury that there is probable cause to proceed against an accused, [the FDA's probable cause] finding... only has vitality once a proceeding is commenced, at which time appropriate challenges can be made." Id. at 147. 45 21 C.F.R. 10.45(d)(2).
position.46
Post-enforcement Judicial Review
There are two post-enforcement/post-indictment reviewability dilemmas. Unlike the pre-enforcement problem, these issues do not involve the actual unavailability of judicial review. Instead, they involve the problem of extreme judicial deference that, in effect, ordinarily results in a total lack of judicial review. Two problems arise because this deference operates at two levels: (1) the FDA may decide to pursue criminal prosecution, rather than pursuing alternative sanctions, and (2) the executive branch-initially the FDA and subsequently the United States Attorney-may decide to prosecute.
In Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Co.,47 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that an agency's choice of sanctions may not be overturned unless it is "unwarranted in law or... without justification in fact .... -48 The Court rejected the argument that an administrative sanction is "rendered invalid in a particular case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases." 4 9 The Court's reasoning in this regard could be used to refute an argument that a decision to recommend prosecution in the face of non-prosecution of similarly situated persons is arbitrary and capricious. 50 The Court stated:
We read the Court of Appeals' opinion to suggest that the sanction was "unwarranted in law" because "uniformity of sanctions for similar violations" is somehow mandated by the [Packers and Stockyards] Act.
We search in vain for that requirement in the statute .... [M] ere unevenness in the application of the sanction does not render its application in a particular case "unwarranted in law." 5 1 In light of Butz, therefore, it is safe to conclude that the choice of prosecution as the appropriate sanction, if it is reviewable at all, is subject to extreme judicial deference. 5 2 Furthermore, "mere un- 46 Moreover, even ifjudicial review were afforded, courts would almost always defer to the FDA's decision. "As long as the agency is choosing how to allocate finite enforcement resources, the agency's choice will be entitled to substantial deference, for the choice among valid alternative enforcement policies is precisely the sort of choice over which agencies generally have been left substantial discretion by their enabling statutes." Chaney, 470 U.S. at 842 (Marshall, J., concurring has exclusive and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case") (dictum).
United States Attorney to prosecute, that party will have to overcome the formidable body of precedent that largely shields such decisions from judicial review.
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Similarly, a challenge to the FDA's decision to recommend prosecution, if it is reviewable at all, would encounter the many cases that give extreme deference to the prosecutorial decisions of administrative agencies. In Pseudonym Taxpayer v. Miller, for example, the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction to restrain the IRS from recommending to the United States Attorney that a taxpayer be criminally prosecuted:
[I]t is not a judicial function to poke about in the discretionary opera Assuming that a party can overcome the considerable hurdle posed by reviewability problems, the question arises whether substantive legal rights are implicated by the involvement of administrative agencies in the criminal enforcement of federal laws. This Article suggests that such rights are, in fact, implicated. 60 In Yick Wo, the Court reversed the conviction of a Chinese man accused of operating a laundry in violation of a county ordinance because the local sheriff enforced the ordinance in an unconstitutional manner by discriminating against persons of Chinese descent. The Court reasoned:
Constitutional Rights
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. Very few cases fall within the limited class of cases in which constitutional deprivations are likely to be found. 64 The Supreme Court has stated that "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." 6 5 To support a due process or equal protection challenge to selective prosecution, a party must show that the prosecution either "was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, ' 66 or that it resulted from "the defendant's exercise of a protected right." 6 7 Moreover, the challenging party must "overcome the presumption that the prosecution was undertaken in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory manner." 68 In United States v. Berrios, which is the most frequently cited case in this area, the Second Circuit summarized the defendant's "heavy burden" as follows:
To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a de- 
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fendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against because of conduct of the type forming the basis of the charge against him, he has been singled out for prosecution, and (2) that the government's discriminatory selection of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional rights.
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By applying the Berrios test or a variation thereof, it is apparent that the vast majority of cases have rejected the equal protection or due process arguments which are based upon allegations of selective prosecution. A heavy burden is also likely if the constitutional argument is couched in terms of discriminatory enforcement. A defendant would first have to show that similarly situated persons have not been prosecuted. Because FDA prosecutions are heavily fact-specific, it may be difficult to show that similarly situated persons have not been prosecuted. The greater obstacle, however, is showing that the decision to prosecute was based upon unjustifiable standards such as race, religion or the exercising of federal constitutional rights. 7 1 It will be virtually impossible to satisfy this second essential element of the discriminatory enforcement defense in the context of a FDA criminal prosecution.
The Right To Consistent And Evenhanded Agency Treatment
If the FDA has not recommended prosecution of persons similarly situated to a particular individual or corporation being prosecuted, the prosecution recommendation could be classified as arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of agency discretion. 72 to agency sanctions. 75 Moreover, the essence of the rule-equality of treatment-has been specifically endorsed by both the FDA 76 and the Department of Justice as a desirable enforcement goal. 7 7 This administrative law principle is grounded in the unassailable proposition that agencies must not discriminate against similarly situated parties, and it recognizes that "[a] fundamental ofjustice is equality of treatment. 7 8 It is an eminently reasonable principle, and a party who relies upon it is not required to overcome the overwhelming contrary precedent that confronts a constitutional challenge to discriminatory enforcement. been given notice and an opportunity to remedy an alleged FDA violation would appear to be a violation of the Accardi doctrine. This doctrine was summarized in a recent district court decision:
[W]hen the rights of an individual are affected, an agency must follow its own procedure, even where the intended procedures are more rigorous than otherwise would be required. Should an agency in its proceedings violate its rules and prejudice results, the proceedings are tainted and any action resulting from the proceedings cannot stand. 80 In Accardi v. Shaughnessy, the Court reversed a discretionary decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("the Board") to deny a petitioner's application for suspension of deportation because the Board failed to follow its procedural regulations for "processing [such] an... application.' ' a l The Board was appointed by the Attorney General and was subject to his overview, but the relevant regulations specifically required the Board "to exercise its own judgment when considering appeals." 82 The Board failed to do so with petitioner's appeal because the Attorney General had, in effect, dictated the Board's decision. Under the regulations, the Attorney General was not supposed to act unless certain things happened first, including the exercise of independent judgment by the Board. Although such predicate acts did not occur, the Attorney General acted anyway, contrary to the regulations. This action would be analogous to either the FDA recommending prosecution of an individual in a routine case or the United States Attorney prosecuting that individual even though the prefatory requirements established by the FDA's prior-warning policy had not been met. To this extent, and to the extent that the challenged agency action was discretionary, Accardi provides direct support for the conclusion that the FDA cannot recommend prosecution of an individual who has not been given a prior warning in compliance with the FDA's policy.
The doctrine which resulted from the Accardi decision is based upon both administrative law and due process principles, although its precise legal foundation is unclear. 83 The doctrine has basically three essential elements. First, there must be an agency rule, regulation, policy or procedure that governs a particular subject. It does not apply to isolated, ad hoc or informal agency positions on such a subject. 8 4 Second, the rule, regulation, policy or procedure must actually affect the rights of individuals, rather than being "a mere housekeeping provision. ' ' 8 5 Third, an individual must be prejudiced because of an agency's failure to follow the rule, regulation, policy or procedure. 8 6 The FDA, like other federal agencies, is 85 United States v. Howard, 590 F.2d 564 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979). In Howard, the Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that petitioner's conviction should be reversed because the government failed to follow "the dual prosecution guidelines formulated by the Department of Justice" for dealing with federal cases that have already been subjected to state prosecution (the so-called "Petite" policy). Id. at 567. The court held that the Petite policy is "a mere housekeeping provision" and held it inapplicable to a case in which the government failed to comply with a "regulation having force of law" and affecting individual rights. Id. at 567-68 (citation omitted). Accord United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.)("a violation of the internal housekeeping rules of the Department of'Justice doe not entitle Snell to dismissal of the indictment"), cert. denied, 442 U.S. (1974) . Clearly, there is a relationship between the requirements of the Accardi doctrine and the requirement that agencies treat similarly situated parties in a consistent manner. The relationship arises subject to the doctrine's requirements. 8 7 The argument advanced here is that, contrary to the Accardi doctrine, a FDA recommendation of prosecution would constitute a violation of the agency's stated policy of not prosecuting individuals in routine cases if the individuals have not had prior warning of the violations and an opportunity to remedy them. 8 8 Such an argument is supported by the numerous cases in which the Accardi doctrine has been applied to invalidate agency actions. 8 This court cannot inquire into the motives of the United States Attorney for prosecuting this appellant. The United States Attorney must be given wide latitude in order to effectively enforce the federal criminal laws. The policy which the appellant complains of is wholly voluntary in nature and is not founded on case law which would require this court to implement such a policy. Id. at 530. This case is incorrect to the extent that it suggests that an agency must comply with its policies only if they are required by case law. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974)("Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required."). But see Caceres, 440 U.S. at 749 ("A court's duty to enforce an agency regulation is most evident when compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution or federal law."). Moreover, there are cases which support the position that a policy of non-prosecution binds the government. E.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 1973)(vacating a conviction on selective prosecution grounds because defendant was prosecuted for exercising his first amendment rights, but also relying upon the government's failure to follow "its policy of non-prosecution" of certain individuals for failing to carry their draft cards; "it was incumbent upon the government ... to explain why Falk was ... singled out for prosecution in contravention of the government's own procedures"); Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 517 n.10 (7th Cir.) (dictum)(citing Falk for the proposition that courts can invalidate a decision to prosecute where there is a "governmental policy of non-prosecution"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981 Similarly, in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 9 2 the Court reinstated a Department of the Interior employee who had been dismissed in a manner that failed "to conform to the procedural standards" set forth in rules promulgated in a departmental order by the Secretary of the Interior. 93 The Court held that, "as in Service [v. Dulles] , [the Secretary] was bound by the regulations . . .even though without such regulations he could have discharged petitioner summarily." 9 4 The Court emphasized that "in proceedings of this nature," which lack the usual protections of "a cause being tried in a court of law before trained judges, scrupulous observance of departmental procedural safeguards is clearly of particular importance." 95 Accardi, Service v. Dulles, and Vitarelli all involved application of the Accardi doctrine to civil agency action. In Yellin v. United States, 9 6 on the other hand, the Court applied the doctrine to reverse a conviction for criminal contempt. In Yellin, the House Committee on Un-American Activities was found to have "failed to exercise its discretion" according to guidelines set forth in one of its operating rules. 97 As a result, Yellin refused to answer certain questions, and he was convicted of contempt. Rejecting the argument that the rule ..was written to provide guidance for the Committee alone and... In Morton v. Ruiz, 0 0 the Court confirmed that an agency's obligation to adhere to its own rules is not limited to rules set forth in formal regulations. The Morton Court reversed the Secretary of Interior's denial of general assistance benefits because, inter alia, the agency had failed to comply with the procedures set forth in its "manual," which was "an internal-operations brochure intended to cover policies that 'do not relate to the public.' "101 The Court reasoned that
[w]here the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required .... Before the [agency] may extinguish the entitlement of these otherwise eligible beneficiaries, it must comply, at a minimum, with its own internal procedures.
0 2
Morton thus refutes the position that the FDA's prior-warning rule does not bind the agency because the relevant rule is not set forth in a formal regulation.' 0 3
In United States v. Nixon, 104 the Court again applied the Accardi doctrine in a criminal context. In rejecting President Nixon's refusal to respond to a subpoena duces tecum, the Court noted that the Attorney General had enacted a regulation giving the Special Prosecutor wide latitude in seeking relevant evidence. The Court held that the Attorney General must adhere to that regulation:
Here, as in Accardi, it is theoretically possible for the Attorney General to amend or revoke the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor's authority. But he has not done so. So long as this regulation remains Three fairly recent Supreme Court decisions arguably signal a partial retreat from the broad sweep given to the Accardi doctrine in the above cases. 10 6 In the 1979 case of United States v. Caceres, the Court held that taped conversations recorded by the IRS were admissible in a defendant's criminal prosecution even though obtained in violation of agency regulations. 10 7 The Court reaffirmed the vitality of the Accardi doctrine, 10 8 but it was unwilling to apply it at the expense of relevant evidence in a criminal prosecution. 10 9 The decision no doubt resulted in large measure from the Court's displeasure with and disinclination to extend the exclusionary rule. 110 Furthermore, the IRS had "provided for internal sanctions in cases 108 Caceres, 440 U.S. at 751 n.14. 109 Justice Marshall filed a lengthy dissent criticizing the majority's departure from the Court's past insistence that agencies comply with "internal regulations [that] do not merely facilitate internal agency housekeeping, but rather afford significant procedural protections." Id. at 760 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(joined by Brennan, J.).
10 See id. at 754. 111 Id. at 756. 112 Particularly troubling are the Court's suggestion that the Accardi doctrine is somehow less applicable when "the agency was not required by the Constitution or by statute to adopt [the] procedures or rules" that the agency has failed to follow, id. at 749, and the Court's apparent introduction of a party's subjective reliance on the relevant regulation into the Accardi doctrine, id. at 752-53. As the dissent points out, these aspects of the opinion are totally foreign to, and inconsistent with, the Court's prior decisions. E.g., Morton, 415 U.S. at 235 ("it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures .. .even where [they] are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required"); Yellin, 374 U.S. at 123 (reversing a criminal contempt conviction because of non-compliance with a committee rule even though the convicted party did not know The Court's 1981 decision in Schweiker v. Hansen" t3 is also troubling. The Hansen Court held that the government was not estopped from denying petitioner retroactive benefits because a "field representative" of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") failed to comply with the instructions of an internal SSA handbook when interviewing the petitioner. 1 4 With the exception of Caceres, the Court failed to cite or discuss any of its Accardi cases. The facts of Hansen are plainly distinguishable from the hypothetical facts used in this Article, and the Court emphasized in Hansen the inappropriateness of estopping the government because of the negligence of a lower-level agent, especially when such estoppel would adversely affect the public treasury. 1 15 Nevertheless, the Court's refusal to attach significance to the agency's failure to follow its procedural rules supports a challenge to a party's reliance upon a policy statement contained in a FDA staff manual:
[ , J. ). In Brock, the court, in an opinion by then Circuit Judge Scalia, held that the Department of Labor's "Enforcement Policy and Guidelines for Independent Contractors," regarding the enforcement of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § § 801-962 (1982), were not legally binding even though they had been published in the Federal Register. The court stated that, although "an agency must adhere to its own regulations," an agency "need not adhere to mere 'general statement[s] of policy.' " Id. at 536 (citations omitted). The Brock court held that there was "no basis for overturning the Secretary's judgment that his independent contractor enforcement guidelines do not constitute a binding, substantive regulation," because the guidelines were "replete with indications that the Secretary retained his discretion to cite production-operators as he saw fit." Id. at 538. The problem with the court's reasoning is that it largely defeats a central purpose of publishing guidelines: to [Vol. 78
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Additionally, the Court's decision in Heckler v. Chaney 1 7 arguably counters the view that a FDA failure to comply with its priorwarning policy would violate the Accardi doctrine and invalidate any subsequent criminal prosecution. As noted earlier, the Court held in Chaney that a decision by the FDA not to initiate enforcement actions is unreviewable under the APA because it constitutes "agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by law."'" 8 The Chaney Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which had held that the FDA's inaction was reviewable, arbitrary and capricious." 9 The D.C. Circuit had based its decision principally upon the "strong presumption" of reviewability 20 and upon Supreme Court precedent to the effect that a matter is committed by law to agency discretion only "in those rare instances where the governing statute is 'drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' "121 Significandy, the court of appeals held that there was "law to apply" in the form of a FDA policy statement which "made law to govern and guide [the FDA's] discretion in regulating the unapproved use of approved drugs."' 2 2 The court cited the Accardi doctrine in a footnote as partial support for its conclusion that the FDA's policy statement was a binding agency "rule."' 23 This rule, the circuit court concluded, provided part of the law that was available for the court to apply and subjected the FDA's inaction to judicial review.
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court failed to address the applicability of the Accardi doctrine to the FDA's policy statement. The Court, however, did summarily reject the significance of the policy statement for reviewability purposes, in stating:
We . . . find singularly unhelpful the agency "policy statement" on which the Court of Appeals placed great reliance. We would have difficulty with this statement's vague language even if it were a properly adopted agency rule. Although the statement indicates that the agency considered itself "obligated" to take certain investigative actions, that language did not arise in the course of discussing the agency's discretion to exercise its enforcement power, but rather in the context of describing agency policy with respect to unapproved uses of approved drugs by physicians. In addition, if read to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, the statement conflicts with the agency rule on judicial review, 21 C.F.R. § 10.45(d)(2) (1984), which states that "It]he Commissioner shall object to judicial review ... if (i)
[t]he matter is committed by law to the discretion of the Commissioner, e.g., a decision to recommend or not to recommend civil or criminal enforcement action .... " But in any event the policy statement was attached to a rule that was never adopted. Whatever force such a statement might have, and leaving to one side the problem of whether an agency's rules might under certain circumstances provide courts with adequate guidelines for informed judicial review of decisions not to enforce, we do not think the language of the agency's "policy statement" can plausibly be read to override the agency's express assertion of unreviewable discretion contained in the above rule. 125 The Court's ambiguous language with respect to the agency's policy statement clearly runs counter to the position that the FDA's prior-warning policy binds the agency and must be complied with in routine cases if a criminal prosecution is to stand. The Court's actual holding, however, was limited to a finding that the policy statement at issue was inapposite and did not provide "law" for the district court to apply in evaluating the FDA's discretionary decision not to initiate enforcement actions. Therefore, Chaney does notand should not-prevent lower courts from requiring the FDA to comply with its prior-warning policy in routine cases.
In this regard, one lower court decision also merits discussion. In United States v. Heffner, 1 26 the leading Accardi case in the Fourth Circuit, an agency had recommended a case to a United States Attorney for criminal prosecution, although the agency had failed to follow internal instructions which required the agency to give prior warnings to the regulated party. The defendant in Heffner was con-
